University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Volume 21
1988

The Anatomy of a Leading Case: Lawrence v. Fox in the Courts,
the Casebooks, and the Commentaries
M. H. Hoeflich
Syracuse University College of Law

E. Perelmuter

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr
Part of the Legal Education Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons

Recommended Citation
M. H. Hoeflich & E. Perelmuter, The Anatomy of a Leading Case: Lawrence v. Fox in the Courts, the
Casebooks, and the Commentaries, 21 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 721 (1988).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol21/iss4/9

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THE ANATOMY OF A LEADING
CASE: LAWRENCE V. FOX IN THE
COURTS, THE CASEBOOKS, AND
THE COMMENTARIES
M.H. Hoeflich* and E. Perelmuter**

I.

THE ORIGIN OF THE "LEADING CASE"

In spite of the wide diversity of training, practice, and location
of lawyers throughout the United States, virtually all share one
experience: the standard core curriculum of the first year of law
school taught by the case method. The extent to which that experience in parsing cases in contracts, torts, and property shapes
the American legal mentality is open to debate, but it undeniably has an impact. The first-year experience socializes law students in the culture of the law. During this period, students
learn the language of the law and the ways that lawyers think.
During this period, too, students absorb certain basic notions
about legal analysis and the shape of the legal system, and begin
to view the world as common lawyers. Included among these basic notions, the "conventional wisdom" of basic law training, is
the concept of the "leading case." This Article explores the notion of the leading case, and places the concept in an historical
and jurisprudential framework.
Jurisprudentially, the idea of a leading case derives from a
fundamental tenet of the Langdellian approach to the science of
• Dean and Professor of Law and History, Syracuse University College of Law. B.A.,
M.A., Haverford College, 1973; M.A., Cambridge University, 1976; J.D., Yale Law School,
1979. The author wishes to acknowledge his great debt to the discussions and papers of
the students in his seminar on the history of commercial law at the University of Illinois
College of Law. Their insights and their research papers are reflected on every page of
this Article. I have used their work freely in this Article and without them this Article
could not have been written. In a very real sense they, too, are co-authors of this paper
and rather than footnote their contributions individually, I wish to acknowledge them
fully here at the beginning: Matthew Bettenhausen, Eric Blomquist, Dean Gerber, Mark
Maish, Stephen Newbold, Michael Ortiz, Alan Palmer, and Jeffrey Roberts. I also wish
to acknowledge the research assistance of Mr. Christopher Dunford of The Syracuse
University College of Law, Class of 1989.
•• B.A., University of Illinois, Chicago, 1985; J.D., University of Illinois, 1988.
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law. 1 The Langdellian approach viewed cases as reasoned essays
in deductive logic. On this model, a judge is faced by a set of
facts that gave rise to a dispute requiring resolution. The judge's
role is to analyze those facts, order them so that he may apply
underlying "principles of law," and deduce the proper resolution
according to those principles.
The learning process is but a mirror image of this formalistic
view of judicial action. Theoretically, the law student confronts a
reasoned, deductive opinion encompassing both law and fact.
The student must separate out relevant facts and order them in
an approximation of historical accuracy. The student must then
isolate the facts upon which the decision has turned and derive
the more general underlying principle from the facts and the
statement of the specific rule applied. The student of law is thus
like the student of physical science. Both gather the data of reality, detect a pattern therein, and discover the fundamental principles upon which those patterns are constructed.
Of course, many cases involve the same underlying principles
with only minor variations. In order to choose those cases that
will be included in Langdellian teaching materials, like
casebooks, criteria beyond the simple provision of facts and
rules of law must be developed. 2 The principal criterion is clarity
of thought and exposition. Generally, authors will choose cases
that are sufficiently well-written so that students can understand them. A second criterion is simplicity. A case with exceptional or complex facts that confound the "pure" principles will
1. C.C. Langdell was born in New Hampshire on May 22, 1826. He attended Phillips
Exeter, Harvard College, and Harvard Law School, where he was an assistant to Theophilus Parsons during the period in which Parsons was writing his Law of Contracts
(published 1853-55). Langdell moved to New York City in 1854 and began to practice
law. He was not a good trial lawyer but was known as a superb researcher. In 1870,
Charles Eliot, then President of Harvard, at the urging of several leading members of the
Bar, appointed Langdell to be Dane Professor and Dean at the Harvard Law School. In
1871, Langdell published his A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, the first
American casebook. As a result of Langdell's efforts, and those of his protege, James
Barr Ames, the case method of legal education came to predominate first at Harvard
and, eventually, throughout the United States. Among the many biographical sketches of
Langdell, see especially that by James Barr Ames in 8 W. LEWIS, GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS (1909).
2. One of the great puzzles in relation to Langdell himself is how he chose cases for
his casebooks. He seems to have used certain basic rules. For example, Langdell always
chose an English case to illustrate a point, if possible. If there was no English case in
point, he chose a case from Massachusetts or New York. Since Langdell's time, the preference for English cases has disappeared; cases from the United States have become the
norm. Perhaps the greatest change in Langdellian casebooks was initiated by Karl Llewellyn in his casebook on sales. The inclusion of nondecisional materials, a fact perhaps
explained by Llewellyn's interest in statutory as well as case materials, came to be accepted as the norm.
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be undesirable. Ideally, a case chosen for a casebook presents
only a few simple rules, easily discovered. Finally, tradition is
significant. 3 Casebook authors choose cases based upon their
own education and practice and upon what earlier writers have
done. The origin of the "leading case" derives from these criteria. A "leading case" is essentially a case that has become traditional. It is a case that most casebooks in a field utilize, often in
extenso. As such, a leading case may have enormous impact on
the shape of the law, because most lawyers learn the law through
such cases.
The Langdellian method and the concept of a leading case are,
in many respects, merely practical manifestations of legal formalism. The formalistic movement, as it developed in law during
the nineteenth century, was characterized by a tendency to view
legal development and decision-making processes exclusively in
terms of abstract principles and ancillary rules. Legal reasoning
involved only reasoning from established principles. Empirical
data, nonlegal motivations, and nondeductive reasoning were all
excluded from the·legal process." The casebook method of teaching was consistent with this approach to law. A leading case in
this formalistic context was a case wherein a judge clearly expounded a legal principle or set of principles as applied to a particular fact pattern. In short, the leading case was an opinion
that utilized a logical process to reduce abstract principles to
concrete decisions.
Although legal formalism and the Langdellian method have
both encountered substantial and continuing challenge, 11 the
casebook continues to be a mainstay of legal training. Law
professors, law students, and lawyers continue to speak of leading cases and "black letter" law. An examination, however, of
particular leading cases and their distribution in both casebooks
and judicial opinions can provide some salutary, if surprising,
revelations. One case that provides a valuable insight into both
the Langdellian method and legal formalism is Lawrence v.
Fox, 6 the leading case on the right of a third party to sue on a
promise in a commercial context.
3. See Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the Anthology, 85 MICH. L.
1406, 1438 (1987).
4. See Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 95, 119-21 (1986).
5. From the beginning, there were holdouts against Langdellianism; see R. STEVENS,
LAW SCHOOL 73-91 (1983).
6. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
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AS A LEADING CASE

The facts in Lawrence u. Fox are almost paradigmatic.' The
majority opinion is a model of extreme formalism tempered by a
sense of justice. The dissent carries formalism to its logical extreme. Thus, superficially at least, Lawrence u. Fox is a perfect
leading case.
The facts of Lawrence u. Fox are simple. Fox borrowed $300
from Holly, who, in turn, owed $300 to Lawrence. At the time
Holly loaned the money to Fox, Fox promised to pay Lawrence
in the same amount on the following day. On that day, however,
Fox did not repay Lawrence. Holly, meanwhile, disappeared
from the annals of legal history.
Lawrence brought suit against Fox in the Superior Court of
the City of Buffalo. The case was tried to a jury, which returned
a verdict for the plaintiff. Fox appealed the jury's decision to the
New York Court of Appeals, which rendered its verdict in 1859.
Justice Gray, writing for the majority, composed his opinion in
formalistic style. Essentially, the question at issue was whether
Lawrence had a cause of action against Fox for the amount owed
him by Holly, an amount that Fox had promised Holly he would
pay. Outwardly, the opinion is a model of deductive reasoning.
After disposing of several minor evidentiary issues, Justice Gray
turned his attention to two of the basic tenets of nineteenthcentury contract law. First, was there adequate consideration
supporting Fox's promise to Holly? Second, did adequate privity
exist to create an enforceable contract?
As to the issue of the adequacy of consideration to support a
valid contract, Justice Gray accepted the principle sacred to
nineteenth-century legists that no action could be maintained
without consideration. Gray, however, found that under Farley
u. Cleueland, 8 a New York case decided a quarter century
before, there was consideration in the transaction. Gray recited
the facts of Farley u. Cleveland in an effort to demonstrate their
similarity to the facts of Lawrence u. Fox, and then stated simply that "a promise in all material respects like the one under
consideration was valid" under the doctrine of Farley. 9 Interest7. For an interesting discussion of the background of the third-party beneficiary doctrine and the history of the case of Lawrence v. Fox, see Waters, The Property in the
Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1116-39
(1985).
8. 4 Cow. 432 (N.Y. 1825).
9. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. at 270.
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ingly, Gray's opinion does not mention two crucial points about
Farley. First, in Farley the Court assumed but did not decide
that a cause of action would lie on the facts, because the case
concerned a separate issue regarding the applicability of the
New York Statute of Frauds. Second, in Lawrence v. Fox, as in
Farley, there was no evidence of any bargained-for exchange between the parties to the suit, the traditional concept of consideration in Anglo-American law. 10
It was precisely during the nineteenth century that the doctrine of consideration came to play an overweening role in Anglo-American contracts law. During this period, the full notion
of an exchange relationship with interparty bargaining came to
be seen as a prerequisite for a valid contract. Justice Gray's
statements as to the consideration requirement in Lawrence v.
Fox are a model of judicial obfuscation. There is no attempt to
fit the fact pattern within the abstract principle. Rather, Gray
has recourse to the expedient of citing precedent. Gray simply
states that on similar facts consideration was held to be present
in Farley, and that this had been the "settled" law of New York
for a quarter century. In fact, Gray pulled a hat trick-he acknowledged the general principle and found it satisfied, without
analysis or reasoning or basis in the facts. Gray, of course, never
mentioned that the precedent did not, in fact, establish the
point.
On the issue of privity, the other cornerstone of classical nineteenth-century contracts theory, Justice Gray again resorted to
the expedient of simply citing a prior case as precedent. Indeed,
Gray's citation of Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden 11 was, in
many ways, even more disingenuous than his citation to Farley.
Gray stated:
As early as 1806 it was announced by the Supreme Court
of this State, upon what was then regarded as the settled
law of England, "that where one person makes a promise
to another for the benefit of a third person, that third
person may maintain an action upon it." 12
10. On the history of consideration, see Ass'N AM. LAW SCHOOLS, SELECTED READINGS
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 320-597 (1931).
11.
12.
140).

1 Johns. 139 (N.Y. 1806).
Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 271 (1859) (quoting Schermerhorn, 1 Johns. at_
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The difficulty with this citation, however, is that both Dutton v.
Poole, 13 the English case alluded to, and Schermerhorn v.
Vanderheyden involved promises among close relatives and were
thus considered to be exceptions to the general requirement of
privity among the parties.
In fact, Lawrence v. Fox departed significantly from nineteenth-century contract doctrine. The case represented the first
time an American court permitted a third-party beneficiary to
recover in a commercial context. u Regardless of the wisdom of
the result, the majority opinion written by Gray provides a fascinating example of how a judge, bowing to the institutional pressures favoring formalism, could construct a seemingly reasoned
opinion that actually was not reasoned at all. Gray hid behind
the forms and manipulated the formalistic style so as to give the
appearance of a principled, doctrinal analysis.
If this evaluation of Gray's opinion seems rather harsh, it is
nevertheless justified in light of both Judge Comstock's dissent
and the final lines of Gray's opinion that respond to this dissent.
Comstock, a judge who otherwise appears to have left no mark,
wrote a dissent that is a model of close doctrinal analysis and
extreme formalism. His arguments were simple. He, like Gray,
began with the premise that an action in contract requires priv~
ity and consideration. Unlike Gray, however, he found neither
present in the facts of Lawrence v. Fox: "The plaintiff had nothing to do with the promise on which he brought this action. It
was not made to him, nor did the consideration proceed from
him. If he can maintain the suit, it is because an anomaly has
found its way into the law on this subject." 111
Justice Comstock delivered a devastating attack on Gray's
opinion. The dissent began with general principles, and then analyzed their application in the precedents. Comstock recounted
the facts of Farley and Schermerhorn and properly distinguished them from the facts in Lawrence. He concluded his argument by demonstrating that cases permitting a third party to
sue on a contract absent the general requirements of privity and
consideration "belonged to exceptional classes." 16 Because the
facts of Lawrence v. Fox did not fit within any of these recognized exceptions, no action should lie. As an essay in deductive
13.
14.
15.
16.

83 Eng. Rep. 523 (1677).
See Waters, supra note 7, at 1111-12.
20 N.Y. at 275 (Comstock, J., dissenting).
Id. at 281.
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logic and formal case analysis, Comstock's dissent is
irreproachable.
Gray's response to Comstock's dissent is, in many respects,
one of the most interesting judicial pronouncements of the nineteenth century. Gray's appeal to precedent and tradition and his
less than wholly satisfactory analysis could not withstand Comstock's attack. Thus, at the very end of his majority opinion
Gray allowed the veil of formalism to fall away and appealed to
justice: "[I]f ... it could be shown that a more strict and technically accurate application of the rules applied, would lead to a
different result (which I by no means concede), the effort should
not be made in the face of manifest justice. " 17 In these final
lines Gray abandoned formalism for the "grand style" of reasoning and discourse loved by Llewellyn. 18 When the choice caine
down to one of critical application of the rules versus "manifest
justice," Gray (and the other members of the New York Court of
Appeals, with the exception of Comstock) chose justice.

III.

LAWRENCE

v. Fox

IN THE CASEBOOKS

Lawrence u. Fox highlights two conflicting approaches: formalism and the "grand style." The case shows formalism at both
its worst and best, illustrating the degree to which a judge will
bow to institutional pressures to conform, even in tlie "face of
manifest justice." Substantively, Lawrence u. Fox is also a
landmark case in that it established for the first time the right
of a third party to sue on a contract in a commercial context.
Doctrinally, however, the case is rather difficult. Because of
Gray's difficulties in reaching what he considered the right result, the majority opinion is muddied and does not exemplify
clarity of thought or felicity of language. Indeed, Gray's opinion
is far more interesting jurisprudentially than precedentially.
Lawrence u. Fox is, in fact, a difficult precedent because the case
is built on a foundation of misconstruction and false interpretation. Thus the extent to which Lawrence v. Fox has become a
leading case in the development of third-party beneficiary theory is quite remarkable.
17.

Id.

at 275 (emphasis added).

18. On Llewellyn and the "grand style," see K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); see also W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT (1973).
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This Part of the Article presents an analysis of the use of
Lawrence v. Fox 19 in contracts casebooks from Langdell's classic
Cases on Contracts 20 to Fessler and Loiseaux's Contracts: Morality, Economics and the Marketplace. 21 In presenting this
analysis of casebooks published during a 103-year period, I will
examine why Lawrence v. Fox was used to illustrate third-party
beneficiary theory at the expense of other seemingly more worthy cases. I will further contend that these casebooks played a
prominent if not principal role in the ultimate triumph of the
third-party beneficiary doctrine. 22
Langdell's Cases on Contracts includes no American cases regarding third-party rights. Langdell cites, without comment, the
major English cases extending from Dutton v. Poole 23 and
Bourne v. Mason 2" to Tweddle v. Atkinson. 25 Lawrence v. Fox
made its first casebook appearance in Samuel Williston's 1894
Cases on Contracts. 26 In the first edition of Williston's casebook,
it is one of seven cases on third-party rights, none of which is
English. These seven cases include a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, 27 two Massachusetts decisions, 28 and one Wisconsin decision. 29
Why did Williston choose to include Lawrence v. Fox in his
casebook? The structure of the chapter suggests an answer.
Massachusetts law followed English law on the question of
third-party rights. Thus, after the decision in Tweddle v. Atkinson, 30 Massachusetts courts adopted the general rule that third
parties could not enforce promises. 31 In contrast, New York, fol19. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
20. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1879). Langdell
did not use Lawrence u. Fox in his casebook. It first appeared in 1894. See infra note 26
and accompanying text.
21. D. FESSLER & P. LOISEAUX, CONTRACTS: MORALITY, ECONOMICS AND THE MARKETPLACE (1982).
22. This conclusion differs from Professor Waters's views on the development of
third party beneficiary doctrine. Professor Waters ignores the influence of casebooks and
argues that Arthur Corbin was principally responsible for the widespread adoption of the
doctrine. See Waters, supra note 7, at 1172.
23. C. LANGDELL, supra note 20, at 170 (citing 2 Levinz 210 (1677)).
24. Id. (citing 1 Ventris 6 (Q.B. 1669)).
25. Id. at 174 (citing 1 Best & Smith 393 (Q.B. 1861)).
26. S. WILLISTON, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 342 (1894).
27. National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U.S. 123 (1878).
28. Borden v. Boardman, 157 Mass. 410, 32 N.E. 469 (1892); Exchange Bank v. Rice,
107 Mass. 37 (1871).
29. Bassett v. Hughes, 43 Wis. 319 (1877).
30. 1 Best & Smith 393 (1861).
31. See Williston, Contracts for the Benefit of a Third Person, 15 HARV. L. REv. 767,
778-79 (1902).
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lowing Lawrence v. Fox, generally permitted such suits. Thus,
by publishing Massachusetts and New York cases, Williston
showed the two primary legal trends in U.S. jurisdictions. Williston also included Bassett v. Hughes, 32 decided by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in 1877, in order to demonstrate how "frontier"
jurisdictions decided such cases. Significantly, Williston appended lists of cases in other jurisdictions on this same point.
Obviously, Williston made the decision to feature the two opposing trends from New York and Massachusetts. As a result, he
was compelled to cite Lawrence v. Fox because later New York
cases depended upon it.
In this context, it is interesting to note how succeeding
casebooks cited Lawrence v. Fox. During the period of 1879 to
1900, eight casebooks on contracts spanning a wide geographic
area were published. After the appearance of Williston's
casebook, Huffcut and Woodruff was published in 1894, 33 Hopkins in 1896, 34 Pattee in 1896,311 Keener in 1898,36 Ashley in
1899, 37 the second edition of Huffcut and Woodruff in 1900. 38
Huffcut taught at Cornell, Pattee at Minnesota, Hopkins was an
employee of West Publishing, Keener taught at Columbia,
Ashley at New York University, and Woodruff first at Stanford
and then at Cornell. Huffcut and Woodruff attended Cornell,
Pattee attended Iowa, Keener attended Harvard, and Ashley attended Columbia.
Of the six casebooks published between 1894 and 1900 all but
one printed Lawrence v. Fox. 39 Even more interesting is the general structure of each of the chapters containing the case in succeeding books. Huffcut and Woodruff included five cases: Lehow
v. Simonton, •0 a Colorado case; Lawrence v. Fox;41 Bassett v.
Hughes; 42 Borden v. Boardman,-4 3 and Wood v. Moriarty,4 4 a
Rhode Island case. Thus, Huffcut's casebook utilized three of
the five cases printed by Williston, but added cases from Colorado and Rhode Island. Hopkins included only two cases, Law32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

43 Wis. 319 (1877).

E. HUFFCUT & E. WOODRUFF, AMERICAN CASES ON CONTRACT (1894).
E. HOPKINS, HOPKINS' SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1896).
W. PATTEE, ILLUSTRATIVE CASES IN CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1896).
W. KEENER, CASES ON CONTRACTS (1898).
C. ASHLEY, CASES ON CONTRACT (2d ed. 1899).
E. HuFFCUT & E. WOODRUFF, AMERICAN CASES ON CONTRACT (2d ed. 1900).
The sole exception was W. PATTEE, supra note 35.
3 Colo. 346 (1877).
20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
43 Wis. 319 (1877).
157 Mass. 410, 32 N.E. 469 (1892).
15 R.I. 518, 9 A. 427 (1887).
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rence v. Fox and Exchange Bank of St. Louis v. Rice,0 both also
in Williston. Keener, in his 1898 casebook, included a far greater
selection, twenty-three cases in all, of which three ·were English,46 nine were from New York,4 7 two were from Pennsylvania,48 one was from lowa," 9 four were from Massachusetts, 60 one
was from Illinois, 111 one was from Rhode Island, 112 one was from
Minnesota, 113 and one was from the U.S. Supreme Court. 11"
Ashley included only five third-party cases in his 1898 casebook:
two from England, 1111 one from Massachusetts, 116 from New
York,5 7 and one from Illinois. 118 The second edition of Hufft::ut
and Woodruff included twelve cases: one from Colorado,59 from
New York, including Lawrence v. Fox, 60 one from Wisconsin,61
two from Rhode Island,62 one from North Carolina,63 two from
New Jersey,6" one from Massachusetts,611 and one case from a
federal court. 66
45. 107 Mass. 37 (1871).
46. Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 Best & Smith 393 (1861); Price v. Easton, 4 Barnewall &
Adolphus 433 (1833); Dutton v. Poole, 83 Eng. Rep. 523 (1677).
47. Durnherr v. Rau, 135 N.Y. 219, 32 N.E. 49 (1892); Gifford v. Corrigan, 117 N.Y.
257, 22 N.E. 756 (1889); Wheat v. Rice, 97 N.Y. 296 (1884); Todd v. Weber, 95 N.Y. 181
(1884); Little v. Banks, 85 N.Y. 258 (1881); Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y. 280 (1877);
Devlin v. Mayor of New York, 63 N.Y. 8 (1875); Kelley v. Roberts, 40 N.Y. 432 (1869);
Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
48. Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76, 13 A. 184 (1888); Campbell v. Lacock, 40 Pa. 448
(1861).
49. Davis v. Clinton Water Works Co., 54 Iowa 59, 6 N.W. 126 (1880).
50. Borden v. Boardman, 157 Mass. 410, 32 N.E. 469 (1892); Saunders. v. Saunders,
154 Mass. 337, 28 N.E. 270 (1891); Marston v. Bigelow, 150 Mass. 45, 22 N.E. 71 (1889);
Mellen v. Whipple, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 317 (1854).
51. Bay v. Williams, 112 Ill. 91 (1884).
52. Wood v. Moriarty, 15 R.I. 518, 9 A. 427 (1887).
53. Barnes v. Helka Fire Ins., 56 Minn. 38, 57 N.W. 314 (1893).
54. National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U.S. 123 (1878).
55. Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 Best & Smith 393 (Q.B. 1861); Dutton v. Poole, 83 Eng.
Rep. 523 (1677).
56. Marston v. Bigelow, 150 Mass. 45, 22 N.E. 71 (1889).
57. Buchanan v. Tilden, 158 N.Y. 109, 52 N.E. 724 (1899); Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y.
268 (1859).
58. Bay v. Williams, 112 Ill. 91 (1884).
59. Lehow v. Simonton, 3 Colo. 346 (1877).
60. In addition to Lawrence v. Fox, the authors included Buchanan v. Tilden, 158
N.Y. 109, 52 N.E. 724 (1899), and Sullivan v. Sullivan, 161 N.Y. 554, 56 N.E. 116 (1900).
61. Bassett v. Hughes, 43 Wis. 319 (1877).
62. Adams v. Union R.R., 21 R.I. 134, 42 A. 515 (1899); Wood v. Moriarty, 15 R.I.
518, 9 A. 427 (1887).
63. Gorrell v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., 124 N.C. 234, 32 S.E. 720 (1899).
64. Economy Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. West Jersey Title & Guarantee Co., 64 N.J.L. 27,
44 A. 854 (1899); Whitehead v. Burgess, 61 N.J.L. 75, 38 A. 802 (1897).
65. Borden v. Boardman, 157 Mass. 410, 32 N.E. 469 (1892).
66. Boston Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. v. Salem Water Co., 94 F. 238 (1899).
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An examination of the casebooks published between 1895 and
1900 reveals several interesting points. First, Lawrence v. Fox
was clearly a "leading case" by 1900, having been cited in six out
of eight books, and six out of seven that included a section on
third-party rights. After Williston, every casebook with a section
on third-party beneficiaries included this case. No other case approached this frequency of printing. Several, including Dutton v.
Poole 67 and Borden v. Boardman, 68 appear in three casebooks,
but not more.
Equally interesting is the fact that, while the citation of Lawrence v. Fox by Williston made sense structurally as the beginning of one of the two trends in American case law, there is no
such structural justification for the case's appearance in later
books. Furthermore, it is difficult to see the logic behind the
choice of other cases. For example, Huffcut and Woodruff, both
trained and teaching at Cornell, included few New York cases in
their sections on third-party rights. Similarly Keener, trained at
Harvard and teaching at Columbia, though including a significant number of New York cases, also included a large number of
cases from other, nontraditional jurisdictions.
Overall, it appears that in the period prior to 1900 only Lawrence v. Fox became preeminent in the third-party beneficiary
area. Other cases cited by Williston failed to achieve the popularity of Lawrence v. Fox among casebook authors. Considering
the difficulty of the case and the conflict between the majority
and the dissent in terms of approach, this popularity is rather
remarkable. It should be noted, however, that several of the authors disapproved of the majority opinion in Lawrence v. Fox.
Ashley, in particular, applauded Comstock's dissent as the
proper result. 69
Lawrence v. Fox remained a leading case in succeeding decades as well. 70 Lawrence v. Fox appeared in all six casebooks
published between 1913 and 1925. 71 Borden v. Boardman, 72 the
67. 83 Eng. Rep. 523 (1677).
68. 157 Mass. 410, 32 N.E. 469 (1892).
69. See C. ASHLEY, supra note 37, at 133.
70. For a general discussion of the status of contracts scholarship during the period
1870-1930, see Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 1406-26.
71. These six casebooks are: A. CORBIN, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1921); G.
COSTIGAN, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1921); E. HUFFCUT & E. WOODRUFF, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1925); W. KEENER, A SELECTION OF
CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1914); A. THROCKMORTON, ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
ON CONTRACTS (1913); and S. WILLISTON, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS (2d ed. 1922).
72. 157 Mass. 410, 32 N.E. 469 (1892).
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Massachusetts case first cited by Williston, also became a leading case at this time, appearing in five of the six books. 73 During
this period, too, more books began to appear from outside the
elite eastern circle. Throckmorton, educated at Washington and
Lee and teaching at Indiana, published his Illustrative Cases on
Contracts in 1913. 74 It included only Lawrence v. Fox and Borden v. Boardman. Costigan, educated at Nebraska and teaching
at Northwestern, published his Cases on the Law of Contracts
in 1921. 75 Aside from Lawrence v. Fox and Borden v. Boardman,
Costigan included three English cases,76 one other Massachusetts case,77 four other New York cases, 78 a Wisconsin case, 79 a
West Virginia case, 8O a Missouri case,81 a New Jersey case,82 a
Rhode Island case, 83 a case from North Carolina, 84 one from
Louisiana, 85 and one from South Dakota,86 as well as a Supreme
Court case. 87 Also during this period, Arthur Corbin of Yale
published the first edition of his Cases on the Law of Contracts. 88 Corbin, too, printed Lawrence v. Fox, along with twenty
other cases. Of these, five were English,89 three from New
York, 9O one from Massachusetts,91 one from Connecticut,02 one
from Michigan, 93 one from Oregon,94 two from Wisconsin,95 one
73. Only W. KEENER, supra note 71, omitted this case.
74. A. THROCKMORTON, supra note 71.
75. G. COSTIGAN, supra note 71.
76. Dutton v. Poole, 83 Eng. Rep. 523 (1677); Bourne v. Mason, 1 Ventris, 6 (Q.B.
1669); Rookwood's Case, (1590] Croke
77. Flynn v. North Am. Life Ins. Co., 115 Mass. 449 (1874).
78. Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918); Case v. Case, 203 N.Y. 263,
96 N.E. 440 (1911); Gifford v. Corrigan, 117 N.Y. 257, 22 N.E. 756 (1889); and Staff v.
Bemis Realty Co., 111 Misc. 635, 183 N.Y.S. 886 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1920).
79. Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517, 93 N.W. 440 (1903).
80. Jenkins v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 61 W. Va. 597, 57 S.E. 48 (1907).
81. School Dist. v. Livers, 147 Mo. 580, 49 S.W. 507 (1899).
82. Whitehead v. Burgess, 61 N.J.L. 75, 38 A. 802 (1897).
83. Wood v. Moriarty, 15 R.I. 518, 9 A. 427 (1887).
84. Gorrell v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., 124 N.C. 234, 32 S.E. 720 (1899).
85. N.O. St. Joseph's Ass'n v. Magnier, 16 La. Ann. 338 (1861).
86. Fry v. Ausman, 29 S.D. 30, 135 N.W. 708 (1912).
87. National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U.S. 123 (1878).
88. A. CORBIN, supra note 71.
89. Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 Best & Smith 393 (Q.B. 1861); Dutton v. Poole, 83 Eng.
Rep. 523 (1677); Anonymous, (1646] Style 6; Lever v. Heys, Moore, 550 (K.B. 1599);
Rookwood's Case [1590] Croke Eliz. 164.
90. Fosmire v. National Sur. Co., 229 N.Y. 44, 127 N.E. 472 (1920); Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E.639 (1918); Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y. 280 (1877).
91. Gardner v. Denison, 217 Mass. 492, 105 N.E. 359 (1914).
92. Meech v. Ensign, 49 Conn. 191 (1881).
93. Knights of the Modern Maccabees v. Sharp, 163 Mich. 449, 128 N.W. 786 (1910).
94. The Home v. Selling, 91 Or. 428, 179 P. 261 (1919).
95. Sedgwick v. Blanchard, 170 Wis. 121, 174 N.W. 459 (1919); Bassett v. Hughes, 43
Wis. 319 (1877).
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each from South Dakota, 96 Nebraska,97 and Washington,98 two
from Pennsylvania, 99 and one from the Supreme Court. 100
By 1925, a number of changes had taken place in both legal
academe and the style of casebooks. While Lawrence u. Fox continued as the leading case in third-party beneficiary law, law
schools spread West and South. Consequently, casebooks became more national and less influenced by the authors' jurisdictions. Nevertheless, of the eleven cases most often cited in
casebooks published between 1913 and 1925, four were New
York cases, 101 three were English decisions,1°2 one was a United
States Supreme Court decision, 103 and the others were from
Massachusetts, 10• Rhode Island, 10 ~ and South Dakota. 106
The change in the structure of casebook sections on thirdparty beneficiary theory coupled with the maintenance of Lawrence u. Fox as a leading case had significant doctrinal impact.
First, the decline in the use of Massachusetts cases is crucial because Massachusetts was the major U.S. jurisdiction that generally prohibited third-party contract actions at common law. 107
Thus, as the casebooks cited Massachusetts cases less frequently
and often in connection with English cases, students came to see
the New York tradition, begun by Lawrence u. Fox, as the "majority view" in the United States. Second, the broadening of the
geographical base for cases made the casebooks of the 1913-1925
period more "national" in scope and, as a result, may have diminished attacks on the "Harvard" case study method as irrelevant to lawyers in the Midwest and West. 108
96. Fry v. Ausman, 29 S.D. 30, 135 N.W. 708 (1912).
97. Forburger Stone Co. v. Lion Bonding & Sur. Co., 103 Neb. 202, 170 N.W. 897
(1919).
98. John Horstmann Co. v. Waterman, 103 Wash. 18, 173 P. 733 (1918).
99. In re Edmundson's Estate, 259 Pa. 429, 103 A. 277 (1918); Jones v. Commonwealth Casualty Co., 255 Pa. 566, 100 A. 450 (1917).
100. National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U.S. 123 (1878).
101. Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918); Gifford v. Corrigan, 117
N.Y. 257, 22 N.E. 756 (1889); Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y. 280 (1877); and Lawrence v.
Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
102. Dutton v. Poole, 83 Eng. Rep. 523 (1677); Bourne v. Mason, 1 Ventris 6 (Q.B.
1669); Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 Best & Smith 393 (Q.B. 1861).
103. National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U.S. 123 (1878).
104. Borden v. Boardman, 157 Mass. 410, 32 N.E. 469 (1892).
105. Wood v. Moriarty, 15 R.I. 518, 9 A. 427 (1887).
106. Fry v. Ausman, 29 S.D. 30, 135 N.W. 708 (1912).
107. See A. CORBIN, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 991, n.12 (2d ed. 1933).
108. For a further discussion of this point, see infra notes 148-50 and accompanying
text.
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The trends begun before 1925 continued thereafter. Between
1930 and 1939 a number of new editions of existing casebooks as
well as entirely new texts appeared. 109 Second editions of Costigan and Corbin were published in 1932 and 1933, respectively,no
and a third edition of Williston was published in 1930. m The
Midwest was again well-represented. George Goble, a graduate
of Yale and a professor at the University of Illinois, published
his Cases and Materials on Contracts in 1937. 112 George Gardner, a graduate of the University of Illinois teaching at Harvard,
published A Selection of Cases and Materials on the Law of
Contracts in 1939. ns All of these casebooks included Lawrence
v. Fox. Of the twelve cases most· frequently cited in the five
casebooks, four were New York cases,n• three were English
cases,n 6 and one each were from Connecticut, 116 Alabama, 117 Oregon,n8 Minnesota,n 9 Massachusetts, 120 and the United States
Supreme Court. 121
During the periods 1946-1959 and 1961-1983, the simultaneous trends towards maintenance of Lawrence v. Fox as a leading
case and the gradual "nationalization" of casebooks continued.
During the 1960's and 1970's, Lawrence v. Fox truly became a
"leading case" in the full sense of that phrase. In Lon Fuller's
casebooks, Lawrence v. Fox became the first case in the thirdparty section. 122 The same was true in Kessler and Gilmore's
book, 123 in Dawson and Harvey, 12' and in Farnsworth and
Young's casebook. 126 In fact, by 1980, not only was Lawrence v.
109. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 1426-29.
110. A. CORBIN, supra note 107; G. CosTJGAN, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d
ed. 1932).
111. S. WILLISTON, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAWS OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1930).
112. G. GOBLE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (1937).
113. G. GARDNER, A SELECTION OF CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(1939).
114. Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918); Gifford v. Corrigan, 117
N.Y. 257, 22 N.E. 756 (1889); Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y. 280 (1877); Lawrence v. Fox,
20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
115. Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 Best & Smith 393 (Q.B. 1861); Dutton v. Poole, 83 Eng.
Rep. 523 (1677); and Bourne v. Mason, 1 Ventris 6 (Q.B. 1669).
116. Schneider v. Ferrigno, 110 Conn. 86, 147 A. 303 (1929).
117. Copeland v. Beard, 217 Ala. 216, 115 So. 389 (1928).
118. The Home v. Selling, 91 Or. 428, 179 P. 261 (1919).
119. Heins v. Byers, 174 Minn. 350, 219 N.W. 287 (1928).
120. Gardner v. Denison, 217 Mass. 492, 105 N.E. 359 (1914).
121. National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U.S. 123 (1878).
122. L. FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 531 (1947).
123. F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 1119 (2d ed. 1970).
124. J. DAWSON & W. HARVEY, CONTRACT AND CONTRACT REMEDIES 1081 (1959).
125. A. FARNSWORTH & W. YouNG, CONTRACTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 1018 (3d ed.
1982).
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Fox the only case on third-party beneficiary theory printed or

noted in virtually every published contracts casebook, regardless
of the author's training or location, it was generally the case
used to introduce students to the third-party idea.
Indeed, within the past several. decades the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox has won a complete triumph. There are no longer
two views on third-party rights. Comstock's dissent has fallen by
the wayside in a number of books. By 1930, Williston had
dropped the dissent entirely. 126 All that remained of Lawrence v.
Fox was an abridged, "cleaned-up" version of Gray's majority
opinion. Although Farnsworth and Young included the dissent,
they abridged it considerably, omitting the challenge to the logic
of Gray's majority opinion. 127 In short, in the past fifty years,
not only has Lawrence v. Fox emerged as the leading case on
third-party rights in the world of contracts casebooks, it has also
been reduced to Gray's opinion, rather than the two opposing
opinions of Gray and Comstock.
The century between 1894 and 1984, therefore, witnessed an
evolution of contracts casebook treatment of third-party rights.
Williston's two-theory approach has disappeared; Lawrence v.
Fox has become a hoary leading case; and contemporary law students are presented with a view of third-party theory drawn
from a host of cases from jurisdictions throughout the United
States. 128 Students learning third-party beneficiary theory
quickly come to believe that Lawrence v. Fox is and has been
the leading case on third-party beneficiary theory since it was
decided, and will undoubtedly assume that the case's settled
doctrine can be traced in the courts and commentaries as easily
as it can be derived from the casebooks. In that they are misled.

IV.

LAWRENCE

v. Fox

IN THE CouRTS

If the preeminence of Lawrence v. Fox encountered no serious
challenge in the casebooks, its fate in the courts and in commen126. S. WILLISTON, supra note 111, at 354-56.
127. See A. FARNSWORTH & w. YOUNG, supra note 125, at 1021-22.
128. For example, in J. DAWSON & W. HARVEY, supra note 124, the authors include
cases from Minnesota (Jefferson v. Asch, 53 Minn. 446, 55 N.W. 604 (1893)), Washington
(Vikingstad v. Baggot, 46 Wash. 2d 494, 282 P.2d 824 (1955)), South Dakota (Fry v.
Ausman, 29 S.D. 30, 135 N.W. 708 (1912)), Alabama (Copeland v. Beard, 217 Ala. 216,
115 So. 389 (1928)), New Jersey (Joseph W. North & Son v. North, 91 N.J. Eq. 390, 110
A. 581 (1920)), and various federal courts (Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 219 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1955); Rouse v. United States, 215 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir.
1954); McCulloch v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 53 F. Supp. 534 (D. Minn. 1943)).
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taries was rather different. A survey of contracts cases decided
in state courts in New York, Illinois, California, Virginia, and
Massachusetts reveals a fascinating tale. Only New York courts
cited Lawrence v. Fox frequently. In Illinois, California, and Virginia a substantial body of case law grew up around third-party
rights. In each jurisdiction one can find leading precedents that
adopt the doctrines of Lawrence v. Fox. None, however, specifically relies upon the New York case. 129 the body of case law,
while paralleling New York law to some extent, does not look to
Lawrence v. Fox for specific guidance or authority.
In New York itself, the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox went
through periods of expansion and contraction. By 1877, the New
York courts had begun to retreat from the then accepted interpretation of Lawrence v. Fox that, as a general rule, a thirdparty beneficiary could sue to enforce a promise. In Vrooman v.
Turner,1 30 a mortgage case, the Court of Appeals specifically
limited the applicability of Lawrence v. Fox:
The courts are not inclined to extend the doctrine of
Lawrence v. Fox to cases not clearly within the principle
of that decision. Judges have differed as to the principle
upon which Lawrence v. Fox and kindred cases rest, but
in every case in which an action has been sustained there
has been a debt or duty owing by the promisee to the
party claiming to sue upon the promise. . . . [T]here
must be a legal right, founded upon some obligation of
the promisee, in the third party, to adopt and claim the
promise as made for his benefit. 131
Ironically, in 1859 the precedents for third-party actions, such
as Dutton v. Poole, were all noncommercial. The innovation
made by Lawrence v. Fox was to extend such third-party rights
to the commercial context. By 1877, New York courts viewed
Lawrence v. Fox as authorizing a third-party contract right only
in the commercial context where there was a preexisting debt at
issue. Within eighteen years, Lawrence v. Fox changed from a
precedent to be reckoned with in New York, to a disfavored
case.
129. This conclusion is based upon a Lexis survey of cases in those jurisdictions combined with a survey of cases not on Lexis contained in hard-copy reports.
130. 69 N.Y. 280 (1877).
131. Id. at 284-85.
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By 1918, however, the pendulum had swung back. In Seaver v.
Ransom, 132 the New York Court of Appeals, faced with a thirdparty suit in the noncommercial context, established a clear division of the law of third-party beneficiary rights. According to
the majority opinion in Seaver, New York courts recognized
third-party contract rights in three contexts: (1) where a debt
existed between the promisee and the third-party beneficiary;
(2) where the contract was made for the benefit of a close relation; and (3) in certain public-contract cases. The court cited
Lawrence v. Fox, along with Farley v. Cleveland and Vrooman
v. Turner among others, as examples of cases falling within the
first class. 133 Thus, by 1918 the New York courts identified Lawrence v. Fox as one of a number of cases establishing the principle of third-party contract rights. Lawrence v. Fox, however, was
once again revered by the Court of Appeals. It was referred to as
"the great case of Lawrence v. Fox." 13"
Lawrence v. Fox obviously was not an easy case to deal with
as precedent. By distorting the concept of privity and consideration, the case established a broad general rule that a third-party
claimant could sue on a contract. Yet, the doctrine it laid down
was, after a period of some doubt, hailed as progressive. After
1915, the right of third parties to sue in New York was firmly
established and strong citations of authority for that proposition
nearly always included Lawrence v. Fox.
In the courts, therefore, Lawrence v. Fox enjoyed a decidedly
mixed reception. Virtually no court outside of New York ever
cited Lawrence v. Fox. Even in New York, Lawrence v. Fox was
in disfavor until about 1915. Between 1894 and 1918, however,
Lawrence v. Fox became firmly established as the leading case
on third-party contract rights in virtually every published
casebook.

V.

LAWRENCE

v. Fox

IN LA w REVIEWS AND TREATISES

Before we can fully assess the significance of Lawrence v. Fox
in order to discuss the nature of a leading case generally, it is
useful to explore one other area of legal literature-the law reviews and the law treatises. Third-party beneficiary theory was
the subject of an under-appreciated exchange between Samuel
132. 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918).
133. Id. at 237-38, 120 N.E. at 640.
134. Id. at 236, 120 N.E. at 640 (emphasis added).
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Williston and Arthur Corbin. Not surprisingly, Lawrence v. Fox
figured prominently in that debate.
In 1902, Samuel Williston published Contracts for the Benefit
of a Third Person in the Harvard Law Review. 1311 In that article,
he attempted to set forth the current doctrine regarding thirdparty contract rights in the United States. Williston, foreshadowing Seaver v. Ransom 136 and the first Restatement, 137 divided
the subject into commercial and noncommercial situations. Of
the latter he said:
It is in regard to contracts to discharge a debt of the
promisee that the greatest confusion prevails. In the first
place the intrinsic difficulty of the case is greater than
where the third person is the sole beneficiary of the contract. . . . [I]t is in this class of cases that the reasoning
of the co\lrts is most artificial. New York by the decision
of Lawrence v. Fox has done more than any other jurisdictions [sic] to spread and strengthen the theory that a
third person can sue on such a contract. 138
This statement reveals that, to Williston, Lawrence v. Fox
represented the first in a line of cases expressing a progressive
view that granted third-party beneficiaries the right to sue on a
contract. He noted in this same article that, by 1902, only a few
jurisdictions did not allow such a right. 139 New York, however,
was in the lead. Interestingly, Williston seems to have been undisturbed by Gray's opinion. Williston, the master of the formalistic, technical approach, stated:
Promises for the benefit of a third party must also be
distinguished from promises to one who has not given the
consideration for the promise. It is laid down in the
books that consideration must move from the promisee,
and it is sometimes supposed that infringement of this
rule is the basis of the objection to allowing an action by
a third person upon a promise made for his benefit. Such
is not the case. In such promises the consideration does
move from the promisee, but the beneficiary who seeks to
maintain an action on the promise is not the promisee.
135. Williston, supra note 31.
136. 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918).
137. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §§ 133-47 (1928).
138. Williston, supra note 31, at 785 (citation omitted).
139. Id. at 780.
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The rule that consideration must move from the promisee is somewhat technical, and in a developed system of
contract law there seems no good reason why A should
not be able for a consideration received from B to make
an effective promise to C. Unquestionably he may in the
form of a promissory note and the same result is generally reached in this country in the case of an ordinary
simple contract. uo
Williston's explanation of the importance of Lawrence v. Fox
helps explain why it became a leading case during this period.
Because Gray refused to be bogged down in a formalistic approach leading to an unfair result, and because he was willing to
go further than his contemporaries at an earlier date, the New
York cases following Lawrence v. Fox came to stand for progressive legal thought. Even with the narrowing of the doctrine during the latter part of the nineteenth century (a contraction illustrated by Vrooman v. Turner), the New York cases, at least to
Williston, were exemplary. Indeed, Williston's 1902 article may
reveal the hidden agendas of the casebook chapters on thirdparty rights-the attempt to formulate a clear doctrine allowing
suits by third-party contract beneficiaries. Williston appended
three notes to his article. 141 The first lists cases jurisdiction by
jurisdiction that allow recoveries by sole beneficiaries. The second lists cases allowing recoveries by beneficiaries owed a debt
by a promisee. The third lists cases where mortgagees can sue
grantees of mortgagors. Clearly, the purpose of these notes was
to indicate that the doctrine of Lawrence u. Fox was the majority rule.
Sixteen years after the publication of Williston's article, Arthur Corbin published Contracts For the Benefit of Third Persons in the Yale Law Journal. 142 Corbin, the antiformalist, also
found much of value in Lawrence v. Fox, and strongly supported
its doctrine:
For a good many years this decision was severely
criticised, the critics being obsessed with the idea that
privity was logically necessary. Fine distinctions were
often drawn so as to avoid following this decision, but in
140. Id. at 771 (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 804-09.
142. Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 27 YALE L.J. 1008 (1918).
For an in-depth discussion of Corbin's lifelong efforts on behalf of the third-party beneficiary rule, see Waters, supra note 7, at 1148-72.
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spite of some confusion thus caused, the great weight of
authority is in harmony with it and a creditor-beneficiary
can maintain suit. 143
Though Corbin and Williston disagreed on many points of
contract law, both agreed not only that third-party contract beneficiaries should recover where there was a preexisting debt between promisee and beneficiary, but also that Lawrence v. Fox
was the leading case on the point. What is fascinating about this
view, of course, is that Lawrence v. Fox as a leading case was, in
fact, virtually a creation of law professors, not judges, except in
New York. Moreover, even in New York the status of Lawrence
v. Fox was not firmly established until the 1918 decision in
Seaver v. Ransom. Who then, in Corbin's words, "regarded"
Lawrence v. Fox "as the leading authority"? 144 it was the contracts professors.
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is not surprising that Lawrence v. Fox found its way into that quintessential law professors' document, the Restatement of Contracts. 1411 The concept of
"creditor beneficiary" developed in section 133 of the first Restatement is a codification of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox as
developed judicially prior to 1933. 146

VI.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LEADING CASE: THE LESSON OF
LAWRENCE

v. Fox

The history given above illustrates how Lawrence v. Fox became a leading case and shows what it means to be a leading
case. The leading case is, above all, an academic concept that is
firmly rooted in the Langdellian legal universe. As such, the concept is of great import jurisprudentially. To understand its significance fully, it is useful to turn to the debate about the nature
of casebooks that emerged during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. In this regard, one must turn to an article
by Albert Martin Kales, a professor at the University of Chicago. The article was published in the Harvard Law Review in
143.
144.
145.
146.

Corbin, supra note 142, at 1013 (citation omitted).

Id.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 137, at§ 133.

See id.
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1907 and was entitled The Next Step in the Evolution of the
Case-book. 147
Kales' article is an attack not on the casebook method but on
what he calls the "Harvard method." The Harvard method was,
in reality, little more than the emphasis in casebooks on leading
cases drawn from "older and more important jurisdictions,"
rather than upon case law of particular jurisdictions in which
law schools were situated. us In effect, Kales complained that the
casebooks then in use did not prepare law students for practice
adequately, for they taught law as doctrine and principle and
not as actually practiced. Kales summarized his argument in the
following words:
The charge against the present Harvard Law School
case-book is that in the older and more important jurisdictions the work of checking up its results with the local
law has become an impossibility. It does not merely take
time. It can't be done. Life is too short. I venture to assert that to obtain a good working knowledge of the law
in such jurisdictions on topics studied in the Harvard
Law School case-book, it is necessary carefully to note
the actual departures by statute and by decision from the
law as taught by the case-book, to supply new topics
closely related to the subject-matter of the case-book, to
learn the well-settled rules taught by the case-book, or
the solution of controverted questions, in terms of the
cases of the particular jurisdiction. I do not hesitate to
affirm that these steps involve so much labor that the individual student who has mastered the subject-matter of
the case-books can no longer do it for the courses or even
the majority of those which he studies during three years
in a law school. 149
Kales's challenge has been reiterated over the years. His argument illustrates the fundamental division between those who
favor "national" law schools and those who believe · that law
schools ought to cater exclusively to the jurisdictions within
which they are located. The Harvard method of casebook writing obviously favors the national approach.
147. Kales, The Next Step in the Evolution of the Case-book, 21
(1907).
148. Id. at 92.
149. Id. at 95.

HARV.

L.

REV.

92
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Eugene Wambaugh, then of the Harvard Law School, enunciated the traditional response to the attack on the "Harvard
method" in a postscript to Kales's article. Wambaugh remarked:
It ought to be enough to point out that the lawyers of
this country are really not inefficient, and that all of
them, whether educated with Harvard case-books or
other case-books or treatises, have been trained according
to the theory that American law is essentially one science and that the peculiarities of local decisions are not
to be emphasized for students. 1110

Here lies the essential point of difference between Wambaugh
and Kales. Kales was convinced,· as were the Realists twenty
years later, that the peculiarities of local decisions represented
the law in action, while to Wambaugh, they were but trivial
aberrations. Whether Kales or Wambaugh was correct in his
view of law is irrelevant. Rather, an issue raised by their debate
and illustrated by the history of Lawrence u. Fox is jurisprudentially crucial. The point is that casebooks purport to present a
normative view of the law, not what law is but what law ought to
be. It is here that the hidden agenda of the casebook method
and the influence of the concept of the leading case is most
important.
Lawrence u. Fox was not a typical mid-nineteenth-century
contracts case. It distorted the accepted doctrines of privity and
consideration, it misused precedent, and it appealed to a hermeneutic method beyond literal formalism. At the time it was decided, Lawrence u. Fox headed forcefully down a new path. It
was a path that courts in other jurisdictions would eventually
follow, albeit with different turnings, byways, sideroads, and,
perhaps, at a different pace.
The great danger of the Harvard method challenged by Professor Kales was not that it was inefficient pedagogically because
it did not teach students the law they needed to practice. The
purpose of law school education, as most legal educators agree, is
first to teach students to think like lawyers. Substantive education is a goal secondary to that primary purpose. Kales, however,
could have leveled a different challenge against the Harvard
style casebook-namely that it is really part and parcel of the
same movement that led ultimately to the Restatements-the
belief expressed by Professor Wambaugh that "American law is
150. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
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essentially one science" and that when students learn that science they learn law as it is. The process by which Lawrence u.
Fox became a leading case illustrates the power of the casebook.
The casebook author who selects cases in a very real sense
shapes the future of legal development. Although Lawrence u.
Fox does not appear frequently in third-party cases decided
outside of New York, its ubiquity in both the casebooks and the
commentaries ensured that its underlying principles of law
would be discovered by generation after generation of law students, and thus would have enormous impact. The career of
Lawrence u. Fox in the casebooks and the commentaries cannot
be ignored, because the eventual triumph of the third-party contract right was due, in some measure, to tlie inculcation of the
Lawrence u. Fox doctrine in the law schools.
Lawrence u. Fox is the perfect case to illustrate the full significance of the "leading case" concept because it broke with tradition. Indeed, the judge writing for the majority felt compelled to
admit that a more technical reading of the law might yield a
different result. Moreover, Lawrence u. Fox was neither logically
necessary nor problem-free. On the contrary, it was difficult and
muddied. That Lawrence u. Fox became a leading case despite
these factors testifies, one may argue, to the strong desire of
Williston, Corbin, and other law professors that its doctrine be
established and spread .. That courts did not cite Lawrence u.
Fox by name tells little. That jurisdiction after jurisdiction, as
well as the Restatements, adopted its doctrine suggests much.
One might object that it is obvious that a casebook betrays
the bias of its author. That argument, however, was not made in
support of the casebook method of teaching. The casebook in
Langdellian theory is but a small laboratory in which a student
may discover the underlying doctrines of the science of law. To
discover those doctrines as they truly exist, if in fact they exist
at all, requires that the casebook reflect the law as it exists and
not as the authors believe it ought to be. Lawrence u. Fox simply
did not represent the law as it existed in 1894 or in 1921.
Rather, Lawrence u. Fox represented a vision of what the law
should be. By becoming a leading case, Lawrence u. Fox became
a self-fulfilling prophecy and, as such, a silent tool of reform.
CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that there may be much more significance to a leading case than simple educational value. A leading
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case is one of legal academe's most effective tools for legal
change. The inclusion of a such a case in a casebook and thus in
the educational program of novice lawyers creates a precedent
stronger than any court can hope to achieve. The establishment
of Lawrence v. Fox as a leading case in the casebooks and the
commentaries and the gradual acceptance of its doctrine over
that same period illustrates this process well. The leading case
provides an example of the significance of the hidden agendas in
law teaching1111 and the extent to which legal academe affects the
development of the law.

151. Here, of course, one enters the rather murky waters now being explored by
members of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies who argue that there are hidden
political agendas contained in most traditional doctrinal legal scholarship.

